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Abstract The application of the rational choice postulate to a political context
invariably leads to the conclusion that most voters are ill informed when making
the decision on whom to vote for. In this paper, the authors conduct an empirical
evaluation of the rational ignorance theory, based on the model developed by
(Rogoff and Sibert Rev Econ Stud LV:1-16, (1988) and by considering that better
informed voters reward political candidates who show better performances. The
levels of performance are established through the construction of an empirical
frontier using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology. According to
our results, based on the 1997 Portuguese local elections, even though swing voters
do not necessarily behave as rationally ignorant voters, a large majority of voters
are rationally ignorant.
Keywords Voters' behaviour • DEA analysis • Local elections •
Local govemments • Portugal
1 Introduction
Since Downs's seminal work. An Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957),
one ofthe most stimulating issues in the public choice theory is concerned with the
fact that voters may have insufficient information and how this can be used by
political representatives and lobbies to meet their own interests. By applying the
rationality postulate to the characterization of the voter's behaviour. Downs
concludes that the voter is insufficiently informed when deciding on whom to vote
for. Confronting costs and benefits, the rational voter sees that it does not
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compensate to invest much in obtaining information, since the only outcome is
really making a better-informed decision when it comes to voting. Since most
people feel that their vote will not influence the election results, they see no reason
to pay greater attention during election campaigns.
Several studies have established the extremely negative implications this
apparent indifference on the part of the voter has had on social well-being.' The
major problems are linked to the possibility that public opinion is manipulated by
the government and lobbies to meet their own interests. The government can use
the voters' ignorance to avoid an excessively severe evaluation of its performance,
carrying out policies that may harm the interests ofthe general population without
being held accountable for them. At the same time, the voters' ignorance makes
them particularly vuhierable to the influence brought to bear by lobbies. Lobbyists
can mould public opinion to their advantage, by leaving out the negative aspects of
their political proposals and building potentially false cause-effect relationships
which are easily apprehended and seen as acceptable by the voters. Lobbies may
even interfere in the definition of political programmes by gaining influence and a
privileged status with those in office (e.g. Stratmann 1991). A natural consequence
is the distortion of the political market in favour of measures that represent
significant gains to some people and negative consequences for most ofthe others
(Gwartney and Wagner 1988).
Other studies play down the relevance of rational ignorance as a potential
source of political market failure, by considering that the Downsian theory
confuses biased judgements with biased information or lack of information (e.g.
Wittman 1989; Peltzman 1990; Becker 1983, 1985). The arguments presented in
these studies rely mostly on the virtues of competition in the political market and
on the gains of preserving the brand name and reputation of political parties and
candidates. These could offset the potential opportunism of candidates and political
parties.
Ultimately, the rationally ignorant/efficient voter controversy can only be
resolved through empirical testing, although the former is apparently theoretically
more appealing. The specific characteristics of the political market, namely the
indivisibility of choices, the inability to change outcomes over a considerable
period of time, and the inability to account for the intensity of voters' preferences,
substantially reduce the incentives for voters to search for information. Moreover,
political parties may follow a strategy of ambiguity and voters, insufficiently
informed, may not be able to recognize deviations from the declared political
programmes.^
Unfortunately, there has been a lack of empirical evidence regarding the voter's
rational ignorance hypothesis although there is some evidence of rational voter
behaviour (e.g. Mueller 2003).^ In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by indirectly
evaluating the amount of information that voters actually possess. To this end, we
have based our study on the model developed by Rogoffand Sibert (1988), which
was later extended in Rogoff (1990).
' See McNutt (1996) for an interesting survey ofthe issue.
^See, for example, Alesina and Cukierman (1990), or Mueller and Strattmann (1994).
3 To our knowledge, only a few studies have analyzed empirically the voters' rational ignorance.
Some of these studies can be found in Galles and Sexton (1995), Heyndels and Smolders (1994)
and Peltzman (1990).
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In Rogoff and Sibert's model, the rational voter compares his expected utility
under each of the two candidates considered (the incumbent candidate and his
opponent), and is primarily influenced by the competency of the candidates.
Crucial to this model and to the empirical work developed here is the assumption
that the expectations regarding the incumbent candidate are different from the
expectations regarding his opponent. The former's most recent performance
comprises a relevant indicator as to his future achievements, whereas no
information is available on the opponent's current achievements, thus providing
no predictions as to future performance. Therefore, for voters the choice is
essentially between either re-electing the incumbent or selecting an agent from the
population at large (Rogoff 1990, p. 24).
Following Rogoff and Sibert, we assume that better-informed voters reward
political candidates who have had better performances. The information voters have
is then determined by the proximity between electoral results and indicators of
economic performance, controlling for the influence of other factors that decide the
vote, such as the candidate's ideology or image, which could be included in the
"looks" shock of Rogoff and Sibert's model. The rational voter anticipates the future
value of each component based on the candidate's most recent term in oflFice, and
chooses the candidate who ensures the best expected utility level. Therefore, the
incumbent candidate will win the election if the combined expected competence,
image, and ideology exceed that of the other candidate, identified with the average
value of the distribution.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we measure the
candidates' performances through the construction of an empirical frontier using
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology. The calculated efficiencies
are included in the estimate of an electoral approval function in Section 3,
considering the results of the 1997 Portuguese Local Elections. The concluding
section summarizes our fmdings.
2 Measurement of the candidates' performance
The definition of competency in Rogoff and Sibert (1988) bears a close similarity
to the notion of economic efficiency. In fact, it is assumed that the most competent
candidate is the one who more efficiently manages the resources obtained from
taxation, by producing more public goods and services.
In order to test the hypothesis according to which the performance of
incumbents should be judged by rational and informed voters, the DEA method
was used to construct an empirical production boundary for the municipalities
under study. The use of a nonparametric method of efficiency estimation instead of
a parametric one seemed to be preferable, since the latter would demand explicitly
identifying the underlying functional form of the technology. This is a particularly
difficult matter when dealing with public sector organizations, whereas the DEA,
on the contrary, requires only minimal technical and behavioral assumptions."* We
considered each municipality in each year of the term prior to the 1997 elections as
a different Decision Making Unit (DMU), according to the procedure used, among
others, by Boussofiane et al. (1991).
•* For more information regarding this matter see, for example, Ganley and Cubbin (1992).
Table 1
Variable
Input and output
Description
variables selected 6
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Source
Current expenditure of municipality i, in 1.000.000 PTE INE
Total population INE
PUPILSi Number of pupils attending the first four grades of primary schools INE
in municipality i
ROADSi Number of kilometer of municipal roads in municipality i Marktest
WASTEj Urban solid waste disposal in municipality i, in thousands of tons fNE
WATERj Water consumption in municipality i, in thousand cubic meter INE
SEWAGE; Population served by residual water drainage systems, in percentage INE
There were 275 municipalities in Continental Portugal in the period under
study. The use ofthe entire sample, however, would be highly misleading, since it
would mean comparing municipalities with widely differing eharacteristics and
dissimilar technologies. In order to obtain a more homogeneous sample, we
eliminated 114 observations relative to municipalities with over 100,000
inhabitants or less than 10,000. This decision was based on previous studies of
Portuguese local governments (e.g. Costa 1997; Baleiras 1997; Osorio 1997),
which revealed structural differences in the municipalities with very high or very
low population levels. From this subset, we had to further discard 25
municipalities, because some key data were missing. The data set thus comprises
information on 136 municipalities.
The efficiency indices were estimated using the Windows Warwick DFA
software, from the perspective of minimizing inputs and variable returns to seale.
Although the theoretical literature remains largely inconclusive with respect to the
most appropriate model to describe the behaviour of mutiicipalities, a majority of
the contributions focus on input efficiency measures.^ This seems to be an
acceptable standard for the Portuguese case, assuming that local governments take
output as exogenous and endeavour to fulfil citizens' demands. As to the nature of
returns to scale, the use of variable retttms was based on the evidence put forward
in Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993). The authors conclude that there is an important
phenomenon of decreasing rettims to scale in the production function of local
governments, making the DEA methodology with constant returns to scale a highly
inadequate procedure for its assessment.
The input and output variables selected are given in Table 1.
In terms of inputs, we used the total value of current expenditure (CEXP),
taking into account the mtinicipalities' operating expenditure. The use of an
expenditure variable instead of real consumption was due to the impossibility of
obtaining adequate proxies for the capital factor. Since the municipalities have
access to the same capitals' market and pay their employees according to the same
5 See, for example, Hayes and Chang (1990), or Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993).
'^  There was not enough information on the variable ROADS for the year 1997 and on the WASTE
and WATER variables for the year 1994. To fill in the gap in the first variable we used the 1996
values. For WASTE and WATER, we obtained the total expenditure on these services for the year
1994, and divided it by an estimation of its unitary price, obtaining an estimation ofthe quantities
supplied.
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salary tables, it seems acceptable to consider that there is no spatial variation in
prices and, consequently, that cost-efficiency is essentially the same as technical
efficiency.^
The selection of outputs to include was based on an analysis of the
responsibilities assigned to the Portuguese local authorities, followed by the
definition of indicators that best describe their performance in the period under
study. Although Portuguese legislation assigns a wide-ranging intervening role to
local authorities, economic and social development comprising their ultimate goal,
in practice, their role is apparently more restricted, resulting in an excessive
concentration of expenditures in traditional areas. In fact, nearly two thirds of the
available resources are spent on administrative costs, fixed costs (such as water
supply and drainage), and urbanization. The output indicators chosen aim to
capture those services: the PUPILS, ROADS, WASTE, WATER and SEWAGE
variables reflect the municipalities' responsibilities in the fields of education,
transportation, water supply and waste disposal. The POP variable captures the
basic administrative services provided to the local populations. These variables are
at best proxies of the services provided by the municipalities rather than direct
output measures because, unfortunately, no other data are available for the
Portuguese local municipalities. Furthermore, data similar to these have been used
in a number of previous studies found in performance literature on the local public
sector (e.g. Vanden Eeckaut et al. 1993; De Borger and Kerstens 1996).
To analyze the explanatory capacity of the chosen indicators on the amount
spent by the selected municipalities, we have estimated the total cost function
defined in Eq. 1 by ordinary least squares:
In CEXPi = ao + a 1 In PUPILSi + aj In ROADSi + a^ In WASTEi (1)
+ a4 In WATERi + as In SEWAGEi + ae In POPi + e,
The variables are in logarithms, so that the coefficients Q:,(i= 1,. . . ,6)
represent the elasticities of expenditure with respect to each of the indicators. The
results ofthe estimation for the years 1995 and 1996 are presented in Table 2. *
The results attest to the relevance and explanatory power of the chosen
indicators, justifying their use in the assessment of the cost efficiency of the
municipalities under study. The adjusted R^ is very high, revealing the overall
significance of the regression. For all six variables the estimated coefficients have
the expected sign. They are also all significant at the 10% level, except for the one
relating to the extension of municipal roads.^ There remains, however, an
important shortcoming in the outputs considered. Apart from being mere proxies
for the services provided, rather than direct output measures, the chosen indicators
' In the municipalities that have contracted separate companies for water supply and sewage
during the period under study the CEXP variable includes an estimate of the costs of providing
water or water and drainage. The estimate is based on the operational expenditure of the
companies contracted.
^ Since it was not possible to gather complete information on all the variables for the whole period
under study, we have only considered the years of 1995 and 1996, thus ensuring more reliable
estimations.
' However, we have decided to include this variable, due to the importance ofthe maintenance of
local roads within the responsibilities of the Portuguese municipal authorities.
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Table
1995
1996
2 Estimates
C
-0.707
(-1.077)
-0.648
(-0.974)
of the parameters of a total cost
In
PUPILS
0.244
(1.754)
0.147
(1.606)
In
ROADS
0.031
(0.974)
0.050
(1.528)
In
WASTE
0.081
(2.076)
0.160
(3.358)
function
In
WATER
0.145
(4.144)
0.150
(3.752)
(n=136)
In
SEWAGE
0.135
(3.531)
0.123
(3.418)
In
POP
0.332
(1.964)
0.324
(1.891)
Adjusted
R^(%)
81.85
81.93
*(-statistics in parentheses
do not take into account the possible quality differences in the provision of
serviees. Bearing this fact in mind, we obtained information relating to the quality
ofthe WASTE, WATER and SEWAGE indicators, based on the condition ofthe
equipment used to supply those services.'° Unfortunately, the introduction of
quality considerations implied a sharp reduction in our sample, down to only 37
municipalities. Since the discriminating power of the DEA method could be
threatened by such a drastic reduction in the data, we decided to maintain both
samples in the study and assess the local governments' efficiency in the two
situations.
Taking into consideration the described data, we applied the DEA method and
obtained the results summarized in Table 3. "
In both samples the results identify a considerable ntimber of inefficient units
that is particularly high when considering the entire sample. In this case, only 79 of
the total 544 DMUs present a 100% index of relative efficiency, whereas in the
smaller sample, the number of efficient units reaches 58 (39.2%). For the entire
sample, the average efficiency level for the inefficient units is 72.8%, indicating the
same results could be achieved with a cut of nearly 27% in costs.
3 Electoral results and the performance of candidates
Once the main argument for the voters' choice was defined - the competency factor
- the next step consisted in estimate the general model:
= ao + ai COMPj, + aiCONTROLp + (2)
where Vu is the probability that individual «, voting in municipality j , will
support the inctimbent party. COMPj, is the perfonnance indicator ofthe incumbent
of municipality y during the last term in office, and CONTROLj, represents a set of
control variables that may affect the voter's judgement and are assumed to be
'" In INE Estatfsticas do Ambiente, we found information concerning the condition of water
collection sources, lift stations, water mains, water treatment reservoirs, residual water treatment
stations, municipal septic tanks, urban solid waste dumps and solid waste processing and disposal
sites.
" The values ofthe CEXP variable have been deflated by the public expenditure deflator for all
municipalities, in order to compare their values in the different years.
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Table 3 Summary statistics for efficiency measures '^
Mean
All sample 76.747
37 municipalities 87.741
Standard
deviation
16.790
14.802
Skewness Kurtosis
-0.328
-1.088
-0.684
0.208
Minimum
30.74
44.94
Maximum
100
100
Number of
efficient
observations
79 (14.5%)
58 (39.2%)
uncorrelated with the competency factor. fXy is a zero mean error term, with
constant variance o^ and not correlated among individuals.
Since the information needed to estimate the model is only available at an
aggregated level, the estimated model is:
Ky = /3o + ^, COMPJ, + (32 CONTROLj, + iij (3)
where Vj is the proportion of individuals in municipality j who voted for the
incumbent party and /xy is the average error for municipality j . In this case, the
variance in the stochastic term is no longer constant, thus making it necessary to
correct the OLS covariance matrix.'
The model was estimated by considering as a first measure of the competence
factor the average of the efficiency indices calculated for each municipality
according to the DEA method (DEA_AV). Since the use of this indicator could lead
to the misconception that candidates from traditionally inefficient municipalities,
but who had accompUshed good results during their terms in office would be
penalized, we have also considered the annual average variation of the DEA
indices in the period under study (ADEA).
The main control variables considered were the candidate's ideology and the
well-known phenomenon of incumbency-bias. In order to proxy the ideological
component, we took into consideration the results of the 1999 European Parliament
elections for the selected municipalities (IDEO), to establish the local importance
of the incumbent's party.
The advantages of public recognition associated with incumbency were
considered by including a dummy variable (REC) that equals 1, in cases where the
incumbent candidate was running for a second mandate in the 1997 elections. We
also included the dummy variable ND, which took the value of one when the
candidate had been previously elected for at least two mandates. This last variable
was included to test whether the incumbency influence on the electoral results
increased with time in office.
Finally, we included the dummy variable GOV that equals one when the
incumbent's party was the same as the party of the national government (the
Socialist Party). The main purpose of having included this variable was to control
for the potential influence exerted by the government's image on the local
elections. The expected sign of the coefficient in this variable is not clear. On the
one hand, since the 1997 local elections were held in a setting of general
'2 For full results, see Appendices 1 and 2.
'3 In this case, VAR(M;) = ^ /
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Table 4 Estimates of the parameters of the electoral approval function
Dependent variable: share of votes received by incumbent party
Constant
DEAAV
ADEA
IDEO
REC
GOV
ND
Adjusted R^
F
# Observations
23.647 (6.044)***
0.058 (1.327)
-9.292 (-0.714)
0.355 (4.675)***
9.720 (5.435)***
-1.030 (-0.674)
-0.915 (-0.629)
0.30
10.30***
136
25.577 (3.652)***
0.016 (0.219)
0.174(0.864)
0.292 (2.161)**
12.341 (3.490)***
-2.151 (-0.706)
-1.358(0.485)
0.27
3.16***
37
^statistics are in parentheses
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%
White heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient covariance
Models estimated by OLS
benevolence towards the Govemment, we would expect it to be positive. On the
other hand, some studies have suggested that voters perceive mayors in the
opposition as more active in demanding benefits from central govemments, which
would imply a negative sign (e.g. Costa 1997).
The results ofthe OLS estimates are presented in Table 4. '"*
A first analysis of the results confirms the overall significant character of the
regressions, as ascertained by the high significance ofthe F test statistics. The anal-
ysis ofthe statistical significance ofthe individual coefficients shows that the voter is
not particularly sensitive to the candidate's performance, at least not in terms ofthe
way it was represented. None of the coefficients associated with the competence
factor in both estimations is statistically significant.
Ideology and particularly the catididate's congetiial image apparently had some
influence on the voters' decisions. Everything else equal, the fact that the
incumbent candidate had decided to run for another mandate increased the vote for
the party by about ten percentage points or more.'^ The fact that he had been in
office for at least two mandates apparently had no decisive influence on the final
result. The same applied to whether the candidate was from the same party as the
government.
The results apparently sustain the rational ignorance hypothesis: the prevalence
of ideological factors and ofthe incumbency-bias phenomenon can be interpreted
as a sign that voters look to crude proxies when they decide to vote, rather than
make a thorough assessment ofthe candidate's performance. In a context of costly
information, ideologies can be seen as cost-saving devices: voters vote by means of
'''Although it is a common practice in the literature, the use of OLS in the estimation of electoral
approval functions may produce estimated values for the dependent variable (proportion of votes)
that fall outside its range of variation. In this case, the fitted values for the dependent variable all
fell within the [0,1] interval.
'5 Approximately 13 percentage points in the regression with the smaller sample.
Are voters rationally ignorant? An empirical study of Portuguese local elections 39
Table 5 Estimates of the parameters of the electoral approval function'^
Dependent variable: difference in the percentage of votes received by incumbent party
Constant
DEA AV
ADEA
AIDEO
REC
GOV
ND
Adjusted r^
F
# Observations
-2.141 (-0.479)
0.025 (0.569)
-0.406 (-0.025)
1.052(4.750)***
12.505 (5.930)***
-13.006 (-4.051)***
-7.805 (-5.523)***
0.37
14.01***
136
^statistics are in parentheses
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejec
5.785 (0.758)
-0.013 (-0.186)
0.354(1.785)*
1.859(3.171)***
11.568(3.046)***
-25.998 (-2.663)***
-7.558 (-3.567)***
0.36
439***
37
;ted: ***, 1%; **, 5%: and *, 10%
White heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient covariance
Models estimated by OLS
ideologies in order to save the cost of obtaining information about specific issues
(Downs 1957). At the same time, the public recognition of the incumbent candidate
assumes more relevance precisely in a context of rational ignorance, representing a
valuable asset against their opponents (Tullock 1965).
It can be argued, however, that the relevant issue when assessing voters'
rational ignorance is not to explain the behaviour of the entire population of voters,
but rather only that of swing voters.'* Since it is not possible to distinguish the type
of voter that casts a particular vote, in a second approach, we estimated the
regressions mentioned above by considering as the dependent variable the
difference in the percentage of votes for the incumbent's party between 1993 and
1997 (Table 5).
As we can observe in Table 5, the overall significance of the regressions is
higher when we adopt an incremental perspective. The explanatory power of the
regressions is improved. In both regressions the estimated coefficients AIDEO,
REC and ND are statistically different from zero and have the expected sign. The
results indicate that belonging to the government party harms the electoral results
and that incumbents have an advantage, although this advantage is smaller when
the number of terms in office is equal or superior to two. When we consider a
sample with 37 observations, the estimated coefficient of the annual variation of the
DEA index has the expected sign and is statistically significant. This result is
particularly important because it indicates that a majority of the voters are
rationally ignorant whereas swing voters are able to perceive the variation in
efficiency of local governments and to reward competency.
"Since a large part of voters always vote for the same party.
"The AIDEO variable is the difference in the percentage of votes of the incumbent's party
between 1999 and 1994 European Parliament elections.
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4 Some conclusions
According to our empirical evidence, electoral results are more highly influenced
by variables used as proxies of the voters' rational ignorance than those that capture
the efficiency of local governments. The predominant factor that explains electoral
results seems to be the candidate's incumbency. Consequently, factors like the
candidate's image and charisma may dominate a rigorous evaluation of his
performance, giving well-known candidates a relative advantage over other
candidates. The recognition and social visibility of those who have been in office
represent valuable assets against their opponents.
Electoral results are strongly influenced by rationally ignorant voters, but this
does not mean that informed voters are not decisive. When we include an
incremental perspective in our analysis in order to capture the behaviour of swing
voters we obtain a different result. According to our empirical evidence, swing
voters reward local governments with a positive annual variation in the DEA index,
although this result is only obtained when we consider the sample with 37
observations. Bearing in mind that our estimates suffer from certain shortcomings
that may weaken the relevance of the DEA indexes, this is an important result.
Firstly, it is not clear that all the relevant variables in the evaluation of the
efficiency-cost variable have been considered. Despite the fact that the variables
included help to explain most of the municipalities' current expenditure, some
areas have not been covered in this study since there was not enough credible
information available.'* Secondly, several difficulties in quantifying the selected
variables forced us to make compromises so as to fill in the information gaps. The
impact of those information gaps, although appropriately lessened, may have
biased the results. All things considered, we admit that, with improvements in the
empirical analysis, the value and significance of the estimated coefficients of the
DEA indexes may increase. So, it seems reasonable to conclude from our empirical
evidence that swing voters do not necessarily behave as rationally ignorant voters,
even though a large majority of the voters are in fact rationally ignorant.
Appendix 1: DEA efficiency results (136 municipalities)
Municipality
Albergaria a Velha
Albufeira
Alcacer do Sal
Alcochete
Alenquer
Alijo
Aljustrel
Almeirim
Amarante
Amares
Ansiao
1994
81.07
88
48.04
55.67
75.72
100
88.06
81.38
100
95.27
85.69
1995
75.68
100
49.96
50.56
79.81
76.96
87.86
81.98
85.83
78.98
82.28
1996
64.72
100
41.68
52.37
58.03
76.43
91.53
80.65
99.05
82.34
89.42
1997
47.2
100
43.58
52
68.91
76.82
100
77.54
87.33
89.27
82.61
Average
67.17
97.00
45.82
52.65
70.62
82.55
91.86
80.39
93.05
86.47
85.00
Std.
Error
14.95
6.00
3.84
2.16
9.52
11.63
5.68
1.97
7.51
7.27
3.32
Winning party
1997 elections
CDS-PP
PS
PCP/PEV
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
'* We are referring particularly to the area of cultural intervention, for which it was impossible to
determine the correct proxy.
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Arcos de Valdevez
Arganil
Arouca
Aveiro
Azambuja
Baiao
Barreiro
Batalha
Beja
Benavente
Bombarral
Braganga
Cabeceiras de Basto
Cadaval
Caldas da Rainha
Caminha
Cantanhede
Carregal do Sal
Castelo Branco
Castelo de Paiva
Castro Daire
Celodco de Basto
Chamusca
Chaves
Cinfaes
Condeixa a Nova
Coruche
Elvas
Entroncament
Espinho
Estarreja
Estremoz
Evora
Fafe
Faro
Felgueiras
Figueira da Foz
Fundao
Gouveia
Grandola
Guarda
Idanha a Nova
Ilhavo
Lagos
Lamego
Louie
Lourinha
Lousa
Lousada
Macedo de Cavaleiros
Mangualde
Marco de Canaveses
Marinha Grande
Mealhada
Melgafo
Mira
Miranda do Corvo
Mogadouro
Moimenta da Beira
73.19
57.29
78.59
100
62.91
87.23
100
88.11
62.05
72.78
72.85
66.71
49.39
66.29
83.97
91.69
100
100
80.67
79.07
86.88
91.05
70.3
80.03
100
88.86
50.27
77.96
100
65.5
71.57
54.3
78.72
87.18
50.33
80.75
65.69
11,\1
81.69
38.04
100
100
100
38.69
81.66
74.15
100
73.64
100
60.09
70.63
100
80.69
76.54
84.66
83.31
83.29
59.97
74.44
67.7
56.02
83.06
100
76.41
61.24
100
75.91
64.96
67.53
75.99
63.91
76.73
70.27
81.58
96.68
82.26
100
81
78.18
86.19
87.68
65.97
80.41
98.27
82.65
51.46
77.86
100
64
59.83
58.08
64.16
80.91
57.25
67.15
76.09
76.59
84.38
46.15
100
100
78.67
45.88
81.27
87.93
97.28
66.26
91.69
53.16
69.29
100
73.49
71.03
80.24
86.57
82.77
59.4
76.06
69.58
55.79
74.25
95.54
54.75
85.46
100
72.65
60.15
63.24
68.48
64.7
14,01
72.92
89.67
93.37
81.54
100
81.38
69.91
73.73
75.54
67.12
78.9
99.66
84.98
48.77
86.42
100
62.26
60.54
61.23
70.58
86.66
67.9
67.22
100
71.13
81.61
41.02
98.43
100
81.01
42.7
79.85
100
100
63.37
95.09
52.71
69.29
95.18
72.35
71.17
73.92
87.06
76.89
59.66
75.57
79.25
53.92
75.17
100
63.18
91.04
100
79.63
100
64.51
66.73
63.69
90.1
69.59
87.07
94.09
76.81
100
74.14
52.34
71.62
73.6
62.36
86.54
95.89
91.33
49.24
77.91
100
74.07
59.83
55.74
66.73
89.07
81.83
75.08
70.68
87.04
76.54
36.18
100
100
88.67
42.78
75.67
100
100
59.63
87.25
47.5
74.22
100
67.16
75.31
67.43
85.55
81.94
61.67
85.35
72.43
55.76
11,11
98.89
64.31
81.24
100.00
79.08
71.79
67.02
71.01
64.75
72.57
69.77
85.57
93.96
85.15
100.00
79.30
69.88
79.61
81.97
66.44
81.47
98.46
86.96
49.94
80.04
100.00
66.46
62.94
57.34
70.05
85.96
64.33
72.55
78.12
77.98
81.06
40.35
99.61
100.00
87.09
42.51
79.61
90.52
99.32
65.73
93.51
53.37
70.86
98.80
73.42
73.51
76.56
85.62
81.22
60.18
77.86
5.09
1.39
3.99
2.23
8.96
13.54
0.00
6.66
18.91
4.24
4.20
1.38
16.97
2.73
3.54
2.07
10.19
0.00
3.45
12.40
8.05
8.69
3.28
3.44
1.87
3.88
1.19
4.26
0.00
5.24
5.76
3.03
6.36
3.52
13.72
6.61
15.20
6.62
3.27
4.35
0.79
0.00
9.61
2.95
2.74
12.31
1.36
5.93
5.39
5.17
2.33
2.41
5.57
2.83
7.52
1.67
2.94
1.02
5.04
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
CDS-PP
PCP/PEV
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PS
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
CDS-PP
PS
PS
PS
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
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Moita
Mon^ao
Montalegre
Montemor-o-Novo
Montemor-o-Velho
Mortagua
Moura
Nelas
Obidos
Odemira
Olhao
Oliveira de Azemeis
Oliveira de Frades
Oliveira do Bairro
Oliveira do Hospital
Ourem
PaQOS de Ferreira
Palmela
Penacova
Penafiel
Peso da Regua
Pinhel
Pombal
Ponte da Barca
Ponte de Lima
Porto de Mos
Povoa de Lanhoso
Povoa de Varzim
Proenpa a Nova
Reguengos de
Monsaraz
Resende
S, Joao da Madeira
S, Pedro do Sui
Sabugal
Salvaterra de Magos
Santa Comba Dao
Santiago do Cacem
Satao
Seia
Serpa
Serta
Sesimbra
Sever do Vouga
Silves
Sines
Soure
Tabua
Tarouca
Tavira
Tondela
Torres Novas
Torres. Vedras.
Trancoso
Vagos
Vale' de- Cambra
Valen^a
ValbngO'
Valpapos.
100
87,48
70,79
42.47
88,92
81,77
52,66
100
74,61
41,81
100
90,88
86.66
95,36
60,65
80,5
97,99
111
%(>.ll
100
82,19
76,64
89,61
70,4
89,29
61,44
99,62
100
90,52
70,86
100
95,4
57,38
64,12
70,92
ll.€l
49,95
91,93
79,48
62,23
46,96
46,3
100
57,78
64,95
71,96
80,53
100
46,58
93,41
67,5
73,93'
66,44
59;2'
64'88:
78:,29'
lioo;
83,22
100
79,09
66,63
43,08
74,13
81,58
46,48
100
80,71
40,14
82,35
94,9
84,57
100
61,7
76,6
89,26
100
80,43
100
79,69
71,88
91.07
65,38
100
63,19
100
81,37
85,13
55,51
96,52
84,26
52,09
65,46
72,98
75,05
54,04
99,06
85,93
55,13
56,24
47,16
98,17
62,16
42,6
73,66
74,47
100'
50102
TOO-
67,1'8
66,,1'5'
66iO3
74',02
69,i;9'
65,03".
98',37'
77,117'
100
81,06
64,65
42,41
71,65
78,62
49,21
98
79,79
38,8
80,02
89,37
75,41
100
59,34
69,52
83,42
100
80,24
86,43
86,92
72,32
82,36
64,1
96,5
71,05
96,79
96,62
79,01
34,16
85,18
81,37
51,27
62,77
67,51
70,19
53,06
71,11
85,66
47,34
47,14
51,67
95,1
57,12
42,33
82,09
68,57
92,56
50;9'
100
65,86'
72,93'
74', 19'
77,68'
70:18.
64', 86:
HOO'
100'
92,5
86,88
63,53
39,51
72,97
100
96,54
96,56
82,42
35,43
83,64
94,64
75,46
95,68
77,55
77,55
94,56
100
77,95
95,79
84,41
72,52
81,6
65,57
88,94
70,39
100
100
82,92
56,35
80,32
91,5
54,65
59,99
69,55
84,69
58,61
76,45
74,45
48,69
48,83
58,39
98,33
56,61
30,74
66,52
60;81i
l'OO
53,75'
TOO
100
60:58
72189
69,73
66,991
si'.n
100
liOO'
98,13
83,63
66,40
41,87
76,92
85,49
61,22
98,64
79,38
39,05
86,50
92.45
80,53
97,76
64,81
76,04
91,31
94,30
81,22
95,56
83,30
73,34
86,16
66,36
93,68
66,52
99,10
94,50
84,40
54,22
90,51
88,13
53,85
63,09
70,24
75,65
53,92
84,64
81,38
53,35
49,79
50,88
97,90
58,42
45,16
73,56
71,10
98vM
50,31'
98,35'
15\U
68,40'
69,89-
70:16
67,8li
66:33'
99; 59
90,10'
3,75
4,19
3,20
1,60
8,07
9,78
23,68
1,68
3,36
2,71
9,12
2,75
5,94
2,59
8,55
4,65
6,37
11,40
3,55
6,40
3,09
2,22
4,87
2,77
5,47
4,91
1,55
8,90
4,80
15,12
9,28
6,45
2,76
2,34
2,30
6,34
3,58
13,05
5,50
6,83
4,38
5,53
2,04
2,54
14,31
6,45
8,42
3:72
3,30
16:59'
6,25'
4:25i
7,99
2',36i
8:79'
0!82
1I1L70'
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
CDS-PP
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
CDS-PP
PPD/PSD
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PPD/PSD
CDS-PP
PS
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
PS
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PS
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PS
CDS-PP
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PPDTPSD'
PPD/PSD
PS'
PS-
PPD/PSD
CDS-PP
PPD/PSD
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD'
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Vendas Novas
Vieira do Minho
Vila do Conde
Vila Pouca de Aguiar
Vila Real de Santo Ant6nio
Vila Verde
Vinhais
Vouzela
77.84
96.36
100
64.44
61.13
87.13
63.55
97.41
88.25
98.41
100
60.65
53.19
86.66
62.6
89.79
84.08
88.98
97
59.86
47.02
84.91
61.18
86.59
77.22
100
100
60.01
50.09
73.84
59.46
82.23
81.85'
95.94
99.25
61.24
52.86
83.14
61.70
89:01-.
5.27
4.87
1.50
2.16
6.06'
6.27
1.78
6.40
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
Appendix 2: DEA efficiency results (37 municipalities)'
Municipality
Albergaria
a Velha
Alenqii'er
Aljustrel
Ansiao
Arganil
Arouca
Aveiro'
Beja
Benavente
Caldks da'
Rainha
Castelo Branco
Chathusca
Entroncamentb
Estremoz
Evora
Faro
Figueira da
Foz
Grandola
Idanh'a-a-Nova
Ilhavo
Marinha
Grande'
ObiSos
Odeinira
Oliveira de
Azerheis
Penacova
Sabugal
Sahtiago do
Cacem
S. Joab da
Madeira]
S.Pedro do'Sul
Seia
Sever do
Vouga-
Tavira
1994
100
90.82
100
100
73.66-
l'Ob'
lOO'
86; l r
88'.6l'
l''OO'
100
85.01'
100
71.59
100
76.34
86:05
48.08
100
100'
100
94.49
55.09'
100'
97.85
75.48
63.92
100
70.95
97.01
100
62.69'
1995
100
100
99.29
89.5
71.44-
100'
100'
93'.6
84.55'
93.96
100
77.52'
100
81.6
95.79'
88.36
87.33
55.23''
100'
99.34'
91.6
l'o'o
52.4'9'
100'
92.99'
76.4'6
66.98
95.88
61.28
100
l'OO'
69.69
1996
94.59
70.84'
100'
100
68.76
89.54
100
82.45'
76'
l'OO
100
80.08
100
76.41
10b
93.1'2-
100
50.47
100
100
92'.4l
95.9'6'
4'9:98'
94.52
92.76
71.99
63.93
91.07
60.39
100
98.06
70.89
1997
69.32
lOO'
100
93.5
67.9
91.47
loo
100'
78.36'
100
100
73.03'
100
66.19
96;37
l'OO
100
44.94
iOO'
100'
78.53'
99. IT
46:32'
100
89.54
72.48'
69.51'
100'
67.7(5
89;08
100
70.46
Average
90.98
90:42
99.82'
95.75
70.44-
95.25
100.00
90:54'
81'.8'8'
98.4'9'
100.00
78.91
100.0b
73.95
98.04
89.46
93.35
49.68
l'OO.OO
99.84
90.64
9i,i9
50,91
98:63"
93.2'9
74.10
66.09
96;74
65.ro
9i5.52
99:52
68.43'
Std.
Error
l'4.66
1'3'.75
0.36
5:17
2.62
5:5''4'
o.bb
7.8'3'
5:7'6'
3.02
o:oo'5.00
b.oO
6.59
228
9.96
7.70
4.34
0.00'
0:33'
8.91
2'.60'
3:74
2^74
3.43
2.20
2.70
4.2'5
5.10'
5:16
0.97
3'.86'
Winhing party
. 1997 election's
CDS-PP
PS
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
P S
PS
PS
pcpypEv
PCP/PEV
ppb'/psb
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PCP/PEV
PCP/PEV
PS
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD'
PS
PS'
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
CDS-PP'
PS
PS
CDS-PP
PPD/PSD
Winning party
1993;elections
CDS-PP
PS^
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
P S
CbS-PP
PCP/PEV
P'CP/P'EV
PPD/PSb
ppb/psb
pcpypEv
PS
PCP/PEV
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PS
PS-
PS
PCP/PEV
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PCP/PEV
CDS-PP
PS
PS
CDS-PP
PS
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Torres Vedras
Trancoso
Vale de
Cambra
Valen9a
Vendas Novas
100
75.87
100
100
95.81
84.42
73.06
100
83.37
100
94.96
86.94
100
83.04
99.34
84.27
85.42
100
73.35
89.05
90.91
80.32
100.00
84.94
96.05
7.86
6.89
0.00
11.06
5.02
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PCP/PEV
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PCP/PEV
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